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Boys Markets And National Labor Policy
Stephen C. Vladeck*
In 1962, the Supreme Court held in Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson' that section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 2 barred federal
courts from enjoining union violations of no-strike clauses in collective
bargaining agreements. Since Sinclair,violations of this type have been
the subject of considerable discussion, but have resulted in little
litigation. The number of man days lost as a result of no-strike clause
violations is minimal and the frequency of these violations is so small
that it is difficult to imagine that they have any great influence on the
course of industrial relations. Nevertheless, lovers of symmetry have
argued that the judicial shaping of Sinclairproduced a piece that did not
quite fit into the jigsaw puzzle of labor law. The Supreme Court in Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,3 hammered the piece into a
new position, reasoning that it had to be made to fit even if its reshaping
was by the Court rather than by Congress. The Court did not consider,
as this article will attempt to demonstrate, that Sinclairwas in its proper
place, and that an additional adjustment to accommodate it with the
National Labor Relations Act4 might better resolve the statutory
conflict and restore symmetry.
While it is not the primary purpose of this article to analyze all of
the relevant prior litigation or reasoning that together constitute the
background for the Court's decision in Boys Markets, it is necessary to
review the past in order to understand what the Court sought to
accomplish. Only then are the consequences of the recent decision
predictable, and only then is it evident that the Court did not anticipate
those consequences. And perhaps only then is it clear that the Court
overlooked a more appropriate method for resolving the apparent
statutory conflict between section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia 5 and section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).1
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I. 370 U.S. 195 (1962). ,
2.

29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).

3. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
4. 39 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964).
5. "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to
prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein
defined) from doing, whether singularly or in concert, any of the following acts: (a) Ceasing or
refraining to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment.
29
U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
6. "(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed by Congress in 1932 as a
reaction to the widespread 7 misuse by the federal courts of injunctions
against strikes. Section 4 of this act prohibits federal courts from
enjoining individuals or groups involved in labor disputes8 from
engaging in certain activities, including refusals to work. In 1947,
Congress rejected proposals calling for the repeal of this anti-injunction
provision' and enacted section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act. This section gives federal courts jurisdiction over suits arising from
violations of labor contracts.1 Initially, section 301 was considered to be
only jurisdictional,"' but this interpretation was rejected by the Supreme
Court in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills. 12 The dispute in
Lincoln Mills grew out of a collective bargaining agreement between the
union and the employer that contained grievance and arbitration
provisions and a no-strike clause. When the employer refused a Textile
Workers Union request for arbitration, the union brought an action in
federal district court to compel specific performance. 13 The ultimate
decision by the Supreme Court was that federal courts could employ
specific performance, an equitable remedy, to enforce arbitration
provisions in collective bargaining agreements. On first reading, this
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Chapter, or between any
such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.... 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
7. "[It] is because we have now on the bench some judges-and undoubtedly we will have
others-who lack the judicial poise necessary in passing upon the disputes between labor and capital
that such a law as is proposed in this bill is necessary." 75 CONG. REc. 4510 (1932) (remarks of
Senator Norris). See also F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE,THE LABOR INJUNCTION 24-46, 63-81,
200-02 (1930).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964); see note 5 supra.
9. The primary source for this conclusion was the comparison of the original house bills with
the final act. The House of Representatives had originally made an action for breach of a collective
bargaining agreement exempt from Norris-LaGuardia. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., IstSess. (1947).
The Senate simply made the breach of a collective bargaining agreement an unfair labor practice
and allowed the NLRB, but not individuals, to obtain injunctive relief. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1947). See generally Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 485 (1957)
(appendix to opinion of Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For an explanation of the legislative history see
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 205-07 (1962).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964); see note 6 supra.
11. See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348
U.S. 437 (1955).
12. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
13. The district court ordered the employer to comply with the grievance arbitration
provisions. This decision was reversed by the Fifth Circuit. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956).
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decision seemed to fly in the face of the express provisions of the Norris14
LaGuardia Act prohibiting mandatory injunctions in labor disputes.
The Court found, however, that the refusal to arbitrate was not within
the intended purview of the anti-injunction provisions of NorrisLaGuardia and held that the policy behind section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act required that arbitration provisions be
enforced. 5
A year later, the Supreme Court of California, in McCarrollv. Los
Angeles County District Council of Carpenters,6 anticipated that the
Supreme Court would hold that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with federal courts under section 301, provided they apply federal
substantive law. The court held, however, that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was specifically directed to federal court jurisdiction and does not
restrict state courts. Thus, the state courts could enjoin a strike in breach
of a no-strike clause.
The decisions by the Supreme Court in the 1960 Steelworkers
Trilogy"7 were the next significant development. The relevance of these
decisions to this discussion is twofold: (1) their declaration that the
union's consideration in a labor agreement is the no-strike clause, which
is given in exchange for the arbitration provision; and (2) their holding
that the federal courts will compel arbitration or enforce an arbitrator's
award in order to promote the peaceful settlement of labor disputes.
There can be no doubt, since the Trilogy, that the Supreme Court
regards arbitration as the preferred device by which industrial peace
should be maintained during the life of a collective bargaining
agreement. From 1931 to the present, most state courts have consistently
ruled that a court of equity could enjoin a strike in violation of a nostrike clause.' 8 Even in those states with "Little Norris-LaGuardia
Acts," the courts have consistently found that there is no "labor
dispute" and, therefore, that the strike is enjoinable.' 9 In 1962, this line
of cases received Supreme Court approval in Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney." The Court held that section 301 (a) did not deprive the state
14. See note 5 supra.
15. 353 U.S. at 457-59; see note 6 supra.
16. 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
17. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
18. See, e.g., Preble v. Iron Workers Local 63, 260 IIl. App. 435 (1931).
19. Twenty-four states have Little Norris-LaGuardia Acts, but 10 of them exempt strikes in
violation of collective bargaining agreements. Keene, The Supreme Court and No-Strike Clauses:
From Lincoln Mills to Avco and Beyond, 15 VILL. L. REv. 32 (1969).
20. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
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courts of jurisdiction over no-strike violations but rather that their
jurisdiction was concurrent with the federal courts. In 1962, the Court
also extended its quid pro quo concept-arbitration is the consideration
for a no-strike clause-to a case in which the contract did not contain a
no-strike clause. In Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas FlourCo., 21the Court
held that the state court must apply federal substantive law in
considering violations of a no-strike clause and, more importantly, that
a no-strike clause would be implied where the contract provides for the
exclusive resolution of grievances by arbitration.
A conflict similar to the one between section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia
and section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act exists between
section 4 and the Railway Labor Act provision requiring compulsory
arbitration of certain minor contract disputes.22 In Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana Railroad Co.,23 the
Court interpreted the Railway Labor Act holding that a federal
injunction could issue to restrain a no-strike violation, despite the
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Court "accommodated"
the conflicting provisions of the Railway Labor Act and the NorrisLaGuardia Act by determining that the latter was not applicable to
"'minor disputes." 24 The rationale of the Court was that minor disputes
fell within the jurisdiction of the Railway Adjustment Board and that
injunctive relief was necessary to protect the Board's jurisdiction. The
enforcement of the no-strike clause by injunction, according to this
reasoning, was tantamount to enforcement of the "grievance"
arbitration provisions of the Railway Labor Act.
It was not until Sinclairthat the Court had to face squarely a strike
in violation of a no-strike clause in industries not covered by the Railway
Labor Act. The petitioner in Sinclairsought preliminary and permanent
injunctions against a union strike over the application of contract
provisions that were subject to the contract's arbitration provision. The
district court, after first denying a motion to dismiss based on NorrisLaGuardia, dismissed the complaint,2 and the dismissal was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 2' The Supreme Court
affirmed,2 holding that the facts of the case brought it within the anti21. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
22. Arbitration of minor disputes is compulsory upon submission by either party to the
National Railway Adjustment Board, 45 U.S.C. §§ 153(i), (m) (1964), as amended, 45
U.S.C. § 153(m) (Supp. IV, 1969).
23. 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
24. See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711,724 (1945).
25. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 187 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1960).
26. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 290 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1961).
27. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 203 (1962).
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injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.n The majority
found that Congress in enacting section 301 of the LMRA did not intend
to limit the anti-injunction provision of Norris-LaGuardia and that any
such change in the law was a matter for Congress and not the Court. The
Court distinguished Sinclairfrom Chicago River on two grounds: (1) the
legislative histories of the LMRA and the Railway Labor Act were
markedly different, and (2) the striking union in Chicago River had
violated both its contract and its duty under the Railway Labor Act 2 l to
submit the dispute to the Railway Adjustment Board. Mr. Justice
Brennan, dissenting, argued for the accommodation of the NorrisLaGuardia Act and section 301 in the same fashion that the Court had
accommodated Norris-LaGuardia and the Railway Labor Act in
Chicago River.'"
The issue came before the Court again in International
Longshoremen's Association v. Philadelphia Marine Trade
Association 3 1 in which the district court had held the union in contempt
of the court's order enjoining a strike in breach of contract. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, 32 but the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the injunction issued by the district court was so
vague and ambiguous that it was .unenforceable, without regard to the
anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.3 The Court
avoided any discussion of the Sinclairproblem.
Parallel and simultaneous with the development of the Sinclair rule
was the increased use of the federal removal statute34 by uniondefendants in actions for injunctions against strikes in breach of
contract. Because of the reasoning in McCarroll and the Supreme
Court's endorsement of "concurrent" jurisdiction in Dowd, employers
faced with a breach of contract strike would elect to bring their
injunction actions in state courts. Because the state courts exercised the
unrestrained equity power to issue injunctions in such cases, it became
the strategy of union-defendants to seek removal to the federal courts on
the ground that the basic issue involved a federal question. In 1968, the
Supreme Court approved this procedure in A vco Corp. v. Aero Lodge
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).

29. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964).
30. 370 U.S. at 215.
31. 389 U.S. 64 (1967).
32. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 368 F.2d 932
(3d Cir. 1966). The original enforcement decree is reported in 365 F.2d 295 (3d Cir. 1966).
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
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735, InternationalAssociation of Machinists, 35 permitting the removal
of a case in which management sought to enjoin a strike called by the
union in violation of a no-strike clause.
During the same period, lower courts were anticipating the erosion,
and ultimate reversal, of Sinclair. The Fifth Circuit, for example, was
presented with a problem similar to Sinclair in Gulf & South American
Steamship Co. v. National Maritime UnionA6 The court held that in
light of Sinclair, it could not judicially enforce an arbitration award
resolving a no-strike question where there was an absence of specific
authority or power in the arbitrator to find a violation of the no-strike
clause and to order a return to work. In a second case, New Orleans
Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers Local 1418,11 the
court was faced with an arbitration award based on a clause in the
collective bargaining agreement providing not only for final and binding
arbitration, but also empowering the arbitrator to enjoin a work
stoppage. The company, alleging that the work stoppage was continuing
despite the award, brought an action in the district court to enforce the
arbitrator's decision. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal of the company's complaint and held that by affirmative order
the court could grant enforcement of the arbitrator's award since the
arbitrator was specifically granted injunctive power by the parties in
their collective bargaining agreement. The court refused to invoke the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and held prior cases inapplicable, reasoning that
the dispute had been arbitrated and therefore no longer existed. There
was precedent for the court's finding, since the New York Court of
Appeals in Ruppert v. Engelhofer38 had made a similar determination. In
a comparable case, however, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York denied enforcement of an arbitration award despite the
prior holding in Ruppert.3' The court did not believe that the NorrisLaGuardia Act required a distinction between a strike before an
arbitration decision and one following an arbitrator's award directing
the cessation of a work stoppage.
35. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
36. 360 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1966).
37. 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 393 U.S. 828 (1968).
38. 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958). An interesting historical note is
that the same district court, as between the same parties, earlier granted confirmation for an earlier
award, although it refused it in the instant case. Steamship Ass'n v. Longshore Workers, 49
L.R.R.M. 2941 (E.D. La. 1962). Obviously, the district court's view changed because of Sinclair.
39. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc. v. Curran, 65 L.R.R.M. 2095 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

1970]

BOYS MARKETS

II.

THE

Boys Markets DECISION

With this background, the case of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union Local 77040 reached the Supreme Court. It arose in
February 1969, when the litigants were parties to a collective bargaining
agreement containing both arbitration and no-strike provisions. A
dispute which developed over the performance of work by nonbargaining unit personnel was followed by a strike and the invocation of
the arbitration provision. Upon the application of the employer, the
California Superior Court 41 issued a temporary restraining order against
the strike. The union removed the case to the federal district court and
moved to vacate the injunction. The district court, despite Sinclair,
42
directed the parties to proceed to arbitration and enjoined the strike.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the majority found that its
decision in A veo coupled with its holding in Sinclair frustrated the
realization of a primary goal of national labor policy. The Court
rejected the conclusion that congressional inaction indicated an
acceptance of the Sinclair decision and proceeded to evaluate the
relevant policies and goals of the two statutes in conflict. The Court
found that the literal terms of Norris-LaGuardia must be
accommodated with section 301 of the LMRA in order that important
goals of national labor policy-the maintenance of industrial peace and
the expeditious settlement of labor disputes--could be fulfilled. The
Court then reasoned that the whole structure developed for the
enforcement and encouragement of arbitration would collapse if strikes
in breach of collective bargaining agreements could not be restrained.
4 3 therefore, the Court held that a
Relying on the dissent in Sinclair,
federal court may enjoin a strike in violation of a collective bargaining
agreement that provides for grievance procedures culminating in binding
40. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
41. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, Civil No. 948323 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A.
County, 1970).
42. 70 L.R.R.M. 3071 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd, 416 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1969).
43. 370 U.S. at 228. "A District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not grant
injunctive relief against concerted activity unless and until it decides that the case is one in which an
injunction would be appropriate despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. When a strike is sought to be
enjoined because it is over a grievance which both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate, the
District Court may issue no injunctive order until it first holds that the contract does have that
effect; and the employer should be ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of his obtaining an injunction
against the strike. Beyond this, the District Court must, of course, consider whether issuance of an
injunction would be warranted under ordinary principles of equity-whether breaches are occurring
and will continue, or have been threatened and will be committed; whether they have caused or will
cause irreparable injury to the employer; and whether the employer will suffer more from the denial
of an injunction than will the union from its issuance." Id.
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arbitration when the employer is ready to arbitrate and when the
issuance of an injunction is clearly appropriate. The dissent reiterated
the majority opinion in Sinclair,concluding that any change in the law
44
should be made by Congress.
A NEGLECTED APPROACH
In Boys Markets, the Supreme Court selected the courts as the
forum for the resolution of violations of no-strike clauses. The Court
had available, however, a much more sensible forum. It would have been
far more consistent with national labor policy to find that violations of
no-strike clauses constitute prima facie violations of the National Labor
Relations Act, even if this finding required overturning the long-time
policy of the Board to treat such a strike merely as evidence of bad faith
bargaining. 5 Following this procedure, the federal courts would obtain
jurisdiction in injunction actions only on the application of the NLRB,
pursuant to section 10 of the National Labor Relations Act,4" which
would create no conflict with the Norris-LaGuardia Act. This approach
would have the added virtue of leading to the resolution of the dispute
that caused the violation of the no-strike clause in the first instance, since
the Board could determine the bona fides of the parties by the
application of their own agreement. Certainly, this approach would serve
to centralize the adjudication of industrial disputes in the hands of the
agency in which both the Court and Congress have repeatedly placed this
responsibility. Under this procedure, for example, if a court found that a
case presented problems already pre-empted by the National Labor
Relations Act and that the Board had primary jurisdiction, a perfect
accommodation of the three primary statutes governing labor relations
would be achieved. The result, within that statutory framework, would
have more clearly defined the jurisdiction, power, and authority of the
courts, the arbitrators, and the Labor Board. Moreover, this result
would have been more consistent with ChicagoRiver, in which the thrust
of the "minor dispute" holding was the vindication of a statutory
obligation to go to the Railway Adjustment Board.4 7 In non-Railway
Labor Act cases, it would be logical to assume that the appropriate
III.

44. For a current example of a recurrent bill, never approved by Committee, let alone
Congress, see S. 1482, 9 IstCong., Ist
Sess. (1969), introduced by Senator Fannin.
45. See, e.g., Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948). Breaches of contract are not per se
violative of the Act, but constitute merely evidence bearing on the question of good faith.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964).
47. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
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statutory basis is section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act.48 The
section 1041 enforcement of this provision already provides for injunctive
relief under Norris-LaGuardia. If consistency, predictability, and reason
are objectives of the Court, certainly the foregoing approach is far more
rational than its holding in Boys Markets.
The Court has long held that parallelling the arbitration system is
the legislative and judicial structure of the Board. While it is beyond the
scope of this article to discuss either the Board's jurisdiction or its
reaction to arbitration as an alternative remedy, 50 the fact is that in
many areas the Board, and not the courts or the arbitrators, is the
primary source of jurisdiction.
The Board has held that under certain circumstances a refusal to
submit an issue to arbitration is tantamount to a refusal to bargain and
thus a violation of the National Labor Relations Act. 5' One consequence
of the extension of federal court jurisdiction to include strikes in
violation of an arbitration clause is that the Board's determinations in
this area will be superfluous, 52 despite the fact that the Board is a more
appropriate agency to police the commission of statutory violations. It
would have been far more logical for the Court to have considered that
the appropriate forum for the resolution of strikes in violation of
collective bargaining agreements is the Board. The courts should be
employed only if the Board has reason to believe that the illegal activity
violates the statute and that the violation will continue.
A second consequence of the Boys Markets decision is one that the
Court apparently considered because it is implicit in its decision. In
effect, the decision now "legalizes" strikes, even in breach of a no-strike
clause, where the employer refused to arbitrate or when the issue is not
arbitrable. One can legitimately conclude that even if an employer has a
"good faith" doubt about the arbitrability of an issue, he would be left
without a forum to resolve the "good faith" issue if the employees chose
to strike. No such void would be created by vesting primary jurisdiction
in the Board.
At least two decisions subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision
in Boys Markets buttress the position that strikes are "legalized" where
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b) (3), (d) (1964).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 160() (1964).
50. See, e.g., International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), affd sub nom. Ramsey
v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964); Hercules Motor Corp., 136
N.L.R.B. 1648 (1962); Speilberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
51. See, e.g., George E. Carrol, 56 N.L.R.B. 935 (1944).
52. Very recently the Board has again taken the view that violation of an agreement to
arbitrate is an unfair labor practice. Taft Broadcasting Co., CCH LAB. L. REP. (185 CCH NLRB
Dec.), 22,287 (NLRB, Aug. 27, 1970).
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the employer refuses to submit a dispute to arbitration. In United States
Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers Union,53 the employer sought a
preliminary injunction against work stoppages by coal miners. An
injunctive order was granted by the federal district court, ' even though
these "strikes" emanated from grievances over safety conditions, which
might not have been arbitrable under the collective bargaining
agreement. The decision of the district court was unanimously reversed
by the Third Circuit 5 for failure to decide the following issues: (1)
whether the work stoppage was a labor dispute or mass protest against
the government's failure to enforce the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act; 56 (2) whether the issue was properly within the local contract
machinery for dispute settlement, or whether it could be settled only by
collective bargaining on new agreements on a national level; (3) whether
there was a union authorized work stoppage over bona fide grievances;
and (4) whether the conditions in the mines were dangerous. The circuit
court assumed that the employer was not prepared to arbitrate the
dispute. In the second decision, Stroehmann Brothers Co. v. Local 427
Confectionary Workers,5 7 the district court held that the employer was
not entitled to a temporary injunction against strikes that allegedly
violated the collective bargaining agreement's no-strike clause, since the
parties were not contractually bound to arbitrate the dispute.
The explicit language of the dissent in Sinclair and the majority in
Boys Markets lends support to these recent determinations. 58 It seems
evident that the courts will not enjoin strikes unless the strike is in
violation of a no-strike clause, the contract contains a mandatory
arbitration clause covering the strike issue, and the employer is willing to
arbitrate. The Boys Markets decision, therefore, further reduces the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board and encourages
strikes to determine issues of arbitrability which the Trilogy held were
either for the arbitrator or the courts. 59
On balance, Boys Markets is an example of a case in which the
Court could have been far more creative and far more helpful to
practitioners who are concerned with the preservation of collective
bargaining and the orderly resolution of disputes within the framework
of existing law.
53.
54.
55.
(3d Cir.
56.
57.
58.
59.

74 L.R.R.M. 2611 (3d Cir. June 30, 1970).
74 L.R.R.M. 2607 (W.D. Pa. June 25, 1970).
United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers Union, 74 L.R.R.M. 2611, 2612-13
June 30, 1970).
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 742 (March 30, 1970).
74 L.R.R.M. 2957 (M.D. Pa. July 25, 1970).
See note 43 supra.
See John Wiley & Son, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).

